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members of a firm in boards and committees of other firms can affect its independent functioning, 
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of audit committee members and quality of financial reporting in India, second, whether 
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better insights than those exogenously mandated by regulators.  The study finds that endogenously 
determined busyness limits of sub-samples and the full sample explain the association between 
multiple directorships of audit committee members and financial reporting quality in a better way 
than those stipulated by regulators. Further, a lower (higher) level of busyness of audit committee 
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1. Background 
There is an extensive body of research exploring the association between the independence of audit 
committee members and the financial reporting quality (Abbott et al., 2000; 2004; DeZoort et al., 
2002; Bedard et al., 2004; Raghunandan and Rama, 2007; Sharma et al., 2009; Dhaliwal et al., 
2010). An important determinant of the independence of audit committees is the phenomenon of 
audit committee members serving on multiple boards. However, the association between the 
independence of audit committee members and the financial reporting quality is relatively less 
researched (Sharma and Iselin, 2012). In the current study I explore, first, the association between 
the phenomenon of multiple directorships (also referred as ‘busyness’ in the current paper) of audit 
committee members and the financial reporting quality, measured by the discretionary accruals, 
by analyzing data of Indian publicly traded corporates, categorized as local private, foreign and 
government owned firms; second, whether endogenously determined cut-off points/nodes of 
busyness, incorporating firm ownership characteristics, provide better insights when compared 
with the exogenous limits of busyness mandated by the regulator in India; and lastly, whether the 
nature of busyness also affect the financial reporting quality along with the number of it.  
The current study derives its theoretical foundations from the agency, and resource dependence 
theories. An argument following from the agency theory is that an increased busyness level of the 
audit committee members of a firm on boards and committees of other firms can create paucity of 
time and focus, which are necessary ingredients to perform highly specialized tasks related to the 
audit committee, including ensuring objectivity and truthfulness of financial statements; and 
consequently financial reporting quality may deteriorate (Ferris et al., 2003; Sharma and Iselin, 
2012). An alternative argument following from the resource dependence theory is that the multiple 
directorships of audit committee members of a firm underscores their high levels of reputational 
capital, which these directors acquire through their human capital and relational capital. Therefore, 
it may be argued that when busy directors join the audit committee of the firm, then such directors, 
due to the amount and diversity of their accumulated experience, skills, knowledge, among other 
things, can understand financial health of the firm and effectively monitor managerial actions and 
resultantly the quality of financial reports can increase (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Hunton and 
Rose, 2008; He and Yang, 2014). Major contributors to the human capital are education, 
experience, skills, training and expertise of directors; whereas those to the relational capital are 
network of ties with other organizations and external contingencies accumulated over time 
(Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). In the current paper, the human capital and the relational capital put 
together is termed as the reputational capital of directors.    
In the post-Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) environment, there has been a significant increase in corporate 
governance responsibilities and liabilities of boards of directors in many countries including India 
(MCA, 2013). Similarly, there has been a significant increase in the responsibilities of audit 
committee members, particularly in the context of oversight of financial reporting process, 
monitoring of managerial actions, internal audit and control system, auditors’ selection and 
rotation, transparency regarding audit and non-audit services (NAS) fees, auditors’ independence, 
and performance evaluation and issues related to whistle-blowers (Sharma and Iselin, 2012). At 
the same time, the amount of scrutiny and monitoring that the audit committees invite from 
regulators, analysts, institutional investors, and other capital market participants have also 
increased unprecedentedly (Sharma and Iselin, 2012). The section 177 of the Companies Act of 
India (MCA, 2013) has expanded the scope of responsibilities of the audit committees in India, 
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and currently an audit committee is also required to give its recommendations on the matters 
related to appointment of auditors and monitor their independence and performance, approve 
related party transactions, and scrutinize inter-corporate borrowings and investments.  
According to the clause 292A of the Indian Companies Act of 1956 (MCA, 1956), a public 
company having a paid-up capital not less than fifty million rupees must have an audit committee 
comprised of at least three directors and two-thirds of its directors to be non-executive. The Section 
275 of the above law also required limiting maximum number of directorships in the publicly 
traded firms to fifteen, which was later increased to twenty. Nevertheless, there were many 
ambiguities, and exceptions in the law and directors could easily exceed their number of 
directorships over twenty (Hundal, 2013). The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), 
the principal financial regulator of India, recognized in the clause 49 of the listing agreement 
between a firm and a stock exchange in India that in order to improve quality of financial reporting, 
it was important to enhance the independence of the audit committees by changing their 
composition (SEBI, 2000). The clause 49 required an audit committee to have a minimum size of 
three and comprised exclusively of non-executive directors with majority of them must be 
independent directors. However, the revised clause 49 excluded the requirement of the non-
executive directors and instead stipulated that the audit committee must have a minimum of three 
members with two-thirds of them to be independent directors (SEBI, 2004). A significant 
regulatory development witnessed in year 2013 has been the approval of the Companies Act of 
India by the Indian parliament, and now this new law requires an audit committee to have a 
minimum of three directors with independent directors forming a majority. Furthermore, the 
Companies Act 2013 removed the requirement of the independent director to chair the audit 
committees. An insight appears from the above mentioned regulatory developments that several 
revisions have actually paved the way for executive directors to become chairs and members of 
audit committees in India. In promoter dominated corporate settings, such developments can put 
even more pressure on the independent functioning of audit committees. Regarding the multiple 
directorships, the section 165(1) of this newly introduced regulation states that, “No person, after 
the commencement of this Act, shall hold office as a director, including any alternate directorship, 
in more than twenty companies at the same time: Provided that the maximum number of public 
companies in which a person can be appointed as a director shall not exceed ten” (MCA, (2013), 
97).  
In the current paper I have applied the spline regression technique (see Ahlberg et al., 1967; De 
Boor, 2001) in the empirical analysis in order to endogenously determine cut-off points of multiple 
directorships from three to ten. Sarkar and Sarkar (2012) argue that since three directorships is the 
recommended number of outside directorships in the US, many empirical studies even in the non-
US settings have also taken three directorships as a measure of busyness. This is a major limitation 
observed in the extant literature. The range of busyness in the current paper ends at ten, as this is 
the maximum number of directorships that a corporate director can take up according to the section 
165(1) of the Companies Act of India (MCA, 2013). In order to recognize differences in corporate 
institutional settings among firms based on their ownership structure, the full sample is categorized 
into three sub-samples, that is local private, foreign and government firms. It is noticeable that 
after the economic policy of liberalization was initiated in 1991, Indian corporate sector has 
witnessed remarkable expansion of the private sector, which can be further categorized as local 
private and foreign firms, however, at the same time the government sector is still maintaining its 
traditional dominance (Sarkar and Sarkar 2012). This is the reason for doing empirical analysis by 
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taking three sub-samples as well as full sample, as the phenomenon of busyness can affect different 
firms differently.   
For the sub-samples and full sample, the busyness of audit committee members adversely affects 
the financial reporting quality at a lower level of busyness, although at different cut-off points, 
than those specified by regulator. Similarly, the foreign, local private sector firms, and the full 
sample firms experience improvements in the financial reporting quality only at the lower level of 
busyness.  The intensity of busyness affects the financial reporting quality of the government, local 
private firms and full sample unfavorably at a relatively higher level of audit committee members’ 
busyness, whereas, the favorable effects occur only to the foreign firms, albeit, at a lower level of 
busyness.              
The current paper makes several contributions to the extant literature, first, the endogenously 
determined busyness limits explain the association between the multiple directorships of audit 
committee members and the quality of financial reporting better than those exogenously prescribed 
by regulators; second, despite applying the endogenous limits of busyness in the analysis for the 
full sample and sub-samples, the results reveal that ‘one size does not fit all’, that is the cut-off 
points of busyness, highlighting the optimum level of busyness for the different ownership groups, 
are not uniform across sub-samples; third, along with the number of multiple directorships of the 
audit committee members, the nature of multiple directorships also affects the financial reporting 
quality; and lastly, the current paper is one of the few studies in the settings of an emerging 
economy, such as India, and the findings of this paper can be useful for countries having 
comparable corporate landscape.                    
The remainder of the paper is divided into the following sections: prior literature and hypotheses 
development, research design, empirical findings and discussion and conclusions, and future 
research.   
2. Prior Literature and Hypotheses Development 
After witnessing a series of corporate failures, notably Enron, at the beginning of the 21st century, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, 2002) of the USA placed additional emphasis on 
revamping internal corporate governance system, particularly audit committees, in order to 
improve quality of financial reporting, and increase accountability of firm decision makers. Even 
before corporate failures, the Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC) advocated making the audit 
committees more effective and powerful, in order to ensure that firm managements would adopt 
and follow a sound system of internal controls and procedures, assess managerial actions 
objectively through various reviews, and disclosures and make truthful assessment of financial 
reports (BRC, 1999).   
The audit committee is one of the various internal corporate governance mechanisms, and its 
principal objective is to ensure that the financial statements and disclosures are prepared according 
to the legal requirements and accounting standards, in order to portray a comprehensive and true 
picture of the financial health of the firm (Sarens and Abdolmohammadi, 2011). The audit 
committee ensures fairness of financial information, and promotes a culture of accountability 
within the organizational structure of firms (BRC, 1999). The audit committee “…helps to ensure 
that management properly develops and adheres to a sound system of internal controls, that 
procedures are in place to objectively assess management’s practices and internal controls, and 
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that the outside auditors, through their own review, objectively assess the company’s financial 
reporting practices” (Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, (2003), 69).      
The audit committee interacts with the external auditors and firm managements in order to perform 
its core functions. To overcome any possible collisions between the two, the audit committee 
ensures that the firm managers provide all the relevant documents and other information to external 
auditors in order to check the authenticity of financial data. Similarly, to avoid any possible 
collusions between the external auditors and the firm managers, the audit committee recommends 
the scope of the auditing services, the amount of audit fees and the NAS engagements between the 
firm and external auditors (Antle, 1982; Sarkar and Sarkar, 2012). Antle (1982) argues that 
collusions between the firm managers and the external auditors can lead to another dimension of 
the agency theory called two-agent model, whereby, an agent (manager) hires another agent 
(external auditor), theoretically, to enhance the credibility of information, however, in reality, both 
agents are able to collude in order to enhance and protect their personal interests, and therefore, 
inflict the agency costs on the firm. The verification done by the external auditors provides 
legitimacy to the financial information provided by the firm managers; however, the independence 
of implementation of this process can be questioned due to managerial interventions and business 
interests of mangers and auditors.   
The audit committee can perform its functions efficiently, when it is able to operate independent 
of managerial influences (DeZoort et al., 2002). According to the BRC, “Members of the audit 
committee shall be considered independent if they have no relationship to the corporation that may 
interfere with the exercise of their independence from management and the corporation” (BRC, 
(1999), 10). The SOX (2002) mandates an audit committee to be exclusively comprised of 
independent directors, and it directs the national securities exchanges and the national securities 
associations to prohibit the listing of firms that do not comply with the audit committee 
requirements of independence.               
An important determinant of the independence of the audit committee of a firm is the number of 
directorships (boards and committees) taken up by its members in other firms. It can be postulated 
from the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) that a firm by inducting independent directors 
on an audit committee can ensure objectivity, truthfulness and fairness of its financial reports. 
Nonetheless, as the number of outside directorships of the audit committee members of a firm 
increases, their effectiveness to review financial statements may diminish and as a result quality 
of the financial data may deteriorate (Sharma and Iselin, 2012; Ferris et al., 2003). The busyness 
of the audit committee members can adversely affect quality of financial reporting in two ways. 
First, busy audit committee members may not have enough time to verify truthfulness and fairness 
of financial reports. There is no denying the fact that specialized skills, knowledge, and 
experiences of audit committee members are important determinants of the quality of financial 
reporting, however, such virtues can be of little value if the audit committee members become 
overcommitted by taking up multiple directorships and as a result do not have sufficient time to 
effectively monitor, and oversight financial reporting process (Jiraporn et al., 2009; Ahn et al., 
2010). Tanyi and Smith (2015) oppose additional directorships accepted by the audit committee 
members of a firm, because in the post-SOX scenario the responsibilities of audit committee 
members have substantially increased, therefore, additional directorships can inhibit the audit 
committee members to perform their stipulated responsibilities. To supplement their argument, 
Tanyi and Smith (2015) provide evidence that the average number of times an audit committee 
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holds its meetings in a year has increased from 3.2 in 1998 to 8.2 in 2004 (Linck et al., 2009) and 
audit committee’s per meeting duration that used to be ninety minutes in the pre-SOX period has 
risen to five hours in the post-SOX era (Beasley et al., 2009).                                 
Second, when monitoring the financial reporting process, the busy audit committee members may 
not pay attention to certain strategic aspects and such omissions can be harmful to the firm. 
Financial reporting is not an end in itself, as it plays important roles in the formulation, 
implementation, reviews, and revisions of corporate policy, planning, and strategies and decision 
making, among other things. Generally, the process of receiving and processing information, 
followed by actions based thereon pertaining to a given task, restricts the similar process with 
respect to other tasks due to scarcity of attention (Kahneman, 1973; Eysenck and Keane, 1990; 
Fiske, 1995). Similarly, it can be posited from the above statement that when the audit committee 
members of a firm are serving on boards of other firms, they may experience lack of attention, and 
as a result they neither have in-depth understanding of financial reports nor draw inferences about 
the interplay between the key financial characteristics/results and other aspects of firms. Due to 
lack of attention of audit committee members, not only quality of financial reports is compromised 
but even further, such reports lose their utility in the corporate policy, planning and decision 
making. Tanyi and Smith (2015) find that the financial reporting quality of firms deteriorates when 
their audit committee chairpersons and financial expert members are busy. Above finding 
underlines that busy experts of audit committees may find it difficult to focus on their key tasks 
and as a result the financial reporting quality declines. Similarly, based on the analysis of a large 
sample of Australian firms, Méndez et al. (2015) find that increased busyness of the audit 
committee members of a firm limits their capacity to monitor managerial actions, and effectiveness 
to implement internal control mechanisms, which lowers the quality of financial reports. The above 
study further finds that busyness of directors at the overall board level is associated with 
disproportionately higher CEO remuneration, and lower pay-performance sensitivity.         
 
He and Rong (2014) give empirical evidence that the audit committee members in regulated firms 
have fewer directorships in other firms in comparison to their counterparts in unregulated firms. 
Following reasons can be postulated why audit committee members in regulated firms have fewer 
directorships in other firms, first, regulated firms are larger in size, and more complex business 
organizations, therefore, the audit committee members do not have much time and other resources 
to take up additional directorships in other firms beyond a certain level, and second, the audit 
committee members of regulated firms, generally, have longer tenure of affiliation due to certain 
firm specific characteristics of regulated firms. The audit committee members invest relatively 
more time and efforts in understanding the complexity and other dynamics of the regulated firms, 
and these firms find it difficult to find replacement of such members, who become privy to several 
firm specific characteristics. He and Rong (2014) provide empirical support to above arguments 
as they find lower level of earnings management practices at the lower level of the busyness of 
audit committee members in regulated industries.    
A counter argument to the above follows that despite serving on multiple firm boards and 
committees, the audit committee members can still ensure the quality of financial reporting, 
because firms that appoint them in the audit committee can also provide them with the subordinate 
staff, and other related services so that the audit committee can still perform its core tasks 
efficiently; nonetheless, too busy audit committee directors can find it difficult to coordinate their 
multiple tasks, and crosscheck whether accountants have followed compliance with respect to the 
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accounting standards, and legal requirements. The potential loss of reputation and litigation risks 
can act as deterrents to the audit committee members of a firm from taking too many directorships 
in other firms (Skinner and Srinavasan, 2012).        
In a country like India, promoters including individuals and firms, occupy a pivotal place with 
respect to the ownership, and control structure of firms (Sarkar and Sarkar, 2012; Khanna and 
Mathew, 2010). Based on the study of Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), it can be argued that in a 
corporate ownership structure, which is dominated by business groups, similar to that of India, the 
powerful CEOs may handpick and appoint those audit committee members of the firm on boards 
of other group-affiliated firms, who are, generally, loyal to them and poor monitors, in order to 
consolidate their position. Such phenomenon, known as interlocking, gathers even more relevance 
in a country like India, where a director can join as many as ten boards of directors of listed 
companies (MCA, 2013). It can be posited from the agency theory that if promoters follow the 
above mentioned maneuver of interlocking, then a likely by-product may emerge in the form of 
lower monitoring of managerial actions and consequently lower quality of the financial reports. 
Furthermore, the phenomenon of ‘extended interlocking’ can also be observed with the auditor 
joining the trio including promoters, executives and audit committee members of the firm. In this 
arrangement of extended interlocking, the promoters, who have substantial control over firm 
executives, may appoint their favorite audit committee members on the multiple firms in the 
business group, and their social ties gets further fillip with the inclusion of auditors of their choice. 
Johansen and Pettersson (2013) find that in the interlocked relationship audit committee members 
and promotors generally employ the same audit firm in the business group firms. The increasing 
familiarity between the participants of the extended interlocking can result in lesser monitoring of 
managerial actions and diminishing credibility of audit quality, which can result in lower financial 
reporting quality.   
In several countries, regulatory provisions, such as Section 177(4) of the Companies Act of India 
2013, provides for explicit approval of audit committees in the matters pertaining to appointment, 
reappointment, and remuneration of external auditors (MCA, 2013). Such economic dependence 
of audit firms is capable of bringing them closer to the audit committees, who are assumed to be 
already in the influence of the promoters. Furthermore, an audit committee is also supposed to 
monitor auditor performance, and give its approval before the public release of financial statements 
of the firm. Nonetheless, based on some studies (e.g., Chen et al., 2014), it can be expected that in 
an extended interlocking system, the level of diligence, and oversight applied by the audit 
committees, in order to check the auditor performance, may be weaker. In several empirical 
studies, including that of Zang and Emanueal (2008), the proportion of the non-audit revenue to 
total revenue earned by the auditor from a client firm is used as a measure of extended interlocking. 
Based on the above discussion following hypothesis is tested:  
H1: Multiple directorships of the audit committee members unfavorably affect quality of 
information (agency theory).     
However, according to an alternative argument, backed by the resource-dependence theory, 
directors of a firm can perform their core responsibilities efficiently if they have a high quality of 
human capital (experience, expertise, skills) and relational capital (network of ties to other firms, 
external environment and external contingencies) of such members (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; 
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Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). In the current paper, I have named the sum 
of the human capital and the relational capital as the reputational capital. In particular, the audit 
committee functions require specialized skills, experience, and expertise, and also interactions 
with the external environment; therefore, it can be maintained that the phenomenon of busyness 
can provide a platform to audit committee members whereby they can update and enhance their 
reputational capital. Fama and Jensen (1983) hold that similar to that of firms; reputation carried 
by directors in the labor market of corporate directors is highly significant. Accordingly, it can be 
argued that among other determinants the phenomenon of multiple directorships facilitates the 
audit committee members to enhance their reputational capital in the market of corporate directors. 
Several studies provide empirical support for the claim that the audit committee members, serving 
on multiple boards, experience increase in their reputation (Vafeas, 1999, 2001; Perry and Peyer, 
2005).   
Vafeas (1999) considers multiple directorships as a proxy for the reputational capital of 
board/committee directors, which is earned and accumulated over a period of time; therefore, such 
directors have the fear of losing their reputational capital due to regulatory actions, and adverse 
market reactions in the event of their negligent behavior, and poor performance (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1983; Ball, 2009). For example, when a regulator identifies some errors and 
accounting standards violations, and asks the firm to make necessary rectifications in the financial 
statements issued by it, then the audit committee members of such firm are not only highly likely 
to relinquish their audit committee seat in the firm but are also less likely to receive invitations to 
join boards and committees of other firms. Similarly, it can be inferred, based on the findings of 
Helland (2006), that the labor market of corporate directors rewards those audit committee 
members with additional directorships, who detect/prevent financial frauds.      
It is further reasoned that in order to perform their roles and responsibilities objectively non-
executive board members, in general, and audit committee members, in particular, are not expected 
to collude with the firm management. For audit committee members, in order to play their role in 
ensuring fairness and truthfulness of the financial reporting process, it is very important to have 
the attitude of skepticism. It is conjectured that when audit committee members of a firm have 
directorships in other firms, they have less dependence (for example, meeting fees) on a particular 
firm, therefore, busy audit committee members are more likely to maintain arm’s length distance 
from the firm executives and enhance their reputation (Kaplan and Reishus, 1990). The audit 
committee members, holding multiple directorships, are relatively more concerned of the potential 
litigation risk, and erosion of their reputation in the event of detection of financial errors/frauds. 
Such high stakes are capable of bringing the behavioral aspects of audit committee members in 
the forefront, as they may self-impose a system of compliance, skepticism, diligence and 
monitoring, which may be even more stringent than the statutory requirements, in order to ensure 
that financial statements are true, objective and unbiased (Sharma and Iselin, 2012; Skinner and 
Srinavasan, 2012). Sharma and Iselin (2012) further posit that some audit committee directors, 
owing to their higher reputation capital, symbolized by multiple directorships, can be relatively 
upfront in demanding the required information and unobstructed communication with external 
auditors, and other components of internal corporate governance system, from the firm 
management. Therefore, multiple directorships may enhance effectiveness of the audit committee, 
resulting in increased informativeness of financial data. He and Rong (2014) find that for firms 
functioning in unregulated industries, there is an inverse relationship between additional 
directorships of their audit committee members and earnings management practices.            
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It is further argued that since regulators and professional bodies require the audit committee 
members to have specialized qualifications, experience, and expertise, therefore, such 
requirements make them ‘scarce resources’. Sarkar and Sarkar (2012) have highlighted that the 
phenomenon of busyness of audit committee members can be a solution to the problem of scarcity 
of managerial talent. Similarly, it can also be posited from the resource dependence theory that the 
interlocking mechanism used by a firm’s promoters can bring various benefits to it. By appointing 
the audit committee members of a firm on other boards within a business group, promoters can 
make efficient utilization of their managerial resources and thus offset the deficiency of managerial 
talent, which is a big limiting factor in a country like India (Sarkar and Sarkar 2012).      
Similar arguments can also hold true for the extended interlocking arrangement. It may be possible 
that firm auditors and promoters develop difference of opinion, for example, on the matters 
pertaining to the financial reporting compliance; however, in such situation the audit committee 
can mediate between them and diffuse any potential conflict (Chen et al., 2014; DeZoort et al., 
2003). Similarly, due to their finance and accounting background, both education and professional, 
first, the audit committee members of a firm can be more effective in helping auditors to develop 
understanding regarding various firm specific characters, and second, auditors can explain their 
audit policy to the audit committee members in a more meaningful manner. Such cooperation 
between the audit committee members, and auditors may result in the latter experiencing lesser 
pressure to perform their core responsibilities and also building trust between the auditors and the 
firm. The following hypothesis, based on the favorable effects of the busyness of audit committee 
members, is tested.  
H2: Multiple directorships of the audit committee members favorably affect quality of information 
(resource dependence theory). 
When studying the association between the multiple directorships of the audit committee members 
and the financial reporting quality, it is also important to consider the nature of busyness along 
with its number. The amount and complexity of workload is relatively higher when corporate 
directors are members of specialized committees, for example, audit, committee and compensation 
committee. Ferris et al. (2003) highlight that higher compensation can motivate directors to accept 
committee memberships in other firms, and such directors may find it difficult to perform the tasks 
entrusted to them. Tanyi and Smith (2015) and Méndez et al. (2015) also show similar findings.  
H3: High intensity of busyness unfavorably affects the quality of financial reporting.  
It is important to study the association between busyness of audit committee members and 
financial reporting quality in the light of ownership structure of firms. The equilibrium level of 
busyness depends on multiple firm-specific characteristics, requirements, and objectives, 
therefore, the limits to audit committee members’ busyness should be determined endogenously 
(Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). Several other studies (e.g. Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Tanyi and 
Smith, 2015) find empirical evidence to support the above argument that the optimum 
board/committee structure is endogenously determined as it is sensitive to institutional settings of 
the firm and prescribed exogenous limits by the regulator are less effective in enhancing financial 
reporting quality.      
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3. Research design 
3.1 Sample size and data 
 
The analysis of the current paper is based on a final sample of an unbalanced panel of 3733 firm-
years of non-financial publicly traded companies listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and 
National Stock Exchange (NSE) over the period of 2004-12. The full sample of 3733 firm-years 
is further divided into sub-samples of firms categorized on the basis of their ownership including 
2376 local Indian private, 772 government and 585 foreign1 firm-years. The initial dataset 
contained 5386 firm-years, however, 701, 505, and 447 firm-years observations pertaining to 
Indian private, government, and foreign firms, respectively, were lost due to non-availability of 
the data. The major unavailable data in the corporate governance reports were details about 
busyness of audit committee directors (628 firm-years), and financial expertise (242 firm-years) 
of the chairperson of audit committees. Similarly, in the financial statements, major omissions of 
the data were pertaining to expenditure on the NAS (272 firm-years), research and development 
(234 firm-years), and advertisement (277 firm-years).  
 
The data have been obtained from Prowess database, a proprietary of the Center for Monitoring 
the Indian economy (CMIE). In addition to the data obtained from Prowess, information on 
accounting indicators, equity ownership, stock market variables, and other firm characteristics for 
analysis, have been obtained from, annual reports of firms, particularly financial statements and 
corporate governance reports, the SEBI, the BSE and the NSE.     
 
3.2 Empirical methodology and constructs  
 
The definitions, and measurement issues related to explained, and explanatory variables are 
discussed below- 
 
3.2.1 Performance variables  
 
Earnings management practices, carried out by a firm, determine its quality of accounting 
information. In this paper, I have used discretionary accruals as a proxy of the magnitude of 
earnings management, hence, quality of accounting information. Discretionary accruals are 
obtained by subtracting non-discretionary accruals from total accruals. Non-discretionary accruals 
are estimated by using a regression model that regress total accruals on several explanatory 
variables.                       
 
In the current paper, I have used discretionary accruals as a measure of earnings management 
(Bedard et al., 2004).  
 
Discretionary accruals are measured by applying model given by Jones (1991).     
 
DAit = TAit/Ait-1 – [α1 (1/ Ait-1 + α2 (∆REVit/Ait-1) + α3 (PPEit/Ait-1 )+ Ɛit] 
 
DAit               = Discretionary accruals of ith firm in tth (current) period 
                                                          
1 Foreign firms also include those established by the Non-resident Indians (NRIs). 
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TAit       = Total accruals of ith firm in tth (current) period. Total accruals are measured by subtracting 
cash flows from operations from net income before extraordinary items 
Ait-1                   = Assets of ith firm in (t-1)th (previous) period 
∆REVit          = Change in net sales of ith firm in tth (current) period 
PPEit          = Gross value of Property, plant and equipment of ith firm in tth (current) period 
Ɛit                      =Error term 
 
Jones’ (1991) expectation model is used to measure non-discretionary accruals as below: 
 
TAit/Ait-1 = α1 (1/ Ait-1) + α2 (∆REVit/Ait-1) + α3 (PPEit/Ait-1 )+ Ɛit 
 
The term [α1 (1/ Ait-1 + α2 (∆REVit/Ait-1) + α3 (PPEit/Ait-1 )] represents the estimated value of the 
term TAit/Ait-1. Jones (1991) argues that the terms PPEit and ∆REVit signify changes in 
nondiscretionary accruals caused by changing economic environment. Change in revenue affects 
change in working capital, which, in turn affects TA. Revenue is exogenous as it reflects economic 
realities; therefore, one may argue that revenue is an objective measure of corporate performance. 
Nonetheless, according to an alternative argument revenue can be endogenous too, for example 
managers have strong motivation to overstate/understate revenue in accordance to their own utility 
function (Marciukaityte and Szewczyk, 2011).  
 
The term PPEit in the expectations model controls for the proportion of total accruals arising due 
to nondiscretionary depreciation expense. The rationale for using gross value of property, plant, 
and equipment instead of change in it is that total depreciation expense is included in the total 
accruals measure. Similarly, all terms in the accruals expectations model are scaled by lagged 
assets in order to lessen heteroscedasticity (Jones, 1991). The difference between actual and 
estimated values of TAit/Ait-1 denotes discretionary accruals. 
Total accruals are calculated as the change in non-cash working capital before income tax payable 
less total depreciation expenses. Jones (1991) provides a formula of deriving total accruals as 
below:  
TAt = [∆Current Assetst - ∆Casht] - [∆Current Liabilitiest - ∆Current Maturities of Long-Term 
Debtt - ∆income Taxes Payablet - Depreciation and Amortization Expenset. The change (∆) is 
computed between time periods t and t - 1. 
 
Jones (1991) highlights that estimated TA as given in the expectation model represents normal 
accruals, therefore, the total amount of accruals has been taken in the model as against change in 
total accruals. 
 
3.2.2 Busyness variables  
 
Following three busyness variables are below: 
1. Spline 1 Directorships (Spline-1),  
2. Spline 2 Directorships (Spline-2), 
3. Median Committee to Board Size (Comm-BS) 
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The spline regression technique overcomes the limitation of using an exogenously determined cut-
off point of busyness. In this technique, changes in the slope at two pre-determined specific points, 
known as spline knots/nodes/cut-off points, are endogenously determined (Ahlberg et al., 1967).  
Busyness is measured as the audit committee level median of total directorships (board plus 
committees); hereafter referred as median directorships, showing the number of outside 
directorships held by majority i.e. fifty percent of the audit committee. Spline nodes range between 
three to ten directorships taken up by directors. The range starts with ‘three’ directorships as 
majority of empirical studies in the US, and even in non-US settings, take three directorships as a 
measure of busyness. The range ends with ten as this is the maximum number of directorships that 
a corporate director can take up according to the section 165(1) of the Companies Act of India 
(MCA, 2013). Also, the Act does not distinguish between board and committee memberships.     
The spline coefficients are calculated as suppose the financial reporting quality (dependent 
variable) is a function of busyness (independent variable), then ‘x’ is the observed audit committee 
level median directorship and the above mentioned functional relation is estimated at different 
endogenous spline knots/nodes/cut-off points. The Spline-1 and the Spline-2 can be defined as 
below: 
Spline-1 = x, if x < x1 
                   = x1, if x ≥ x1 
 
Spline-2 = 0, if x < x1 
                   = (x-x1), if x ≥ x1 
 
1. Spline-1- This coefficient of the Spline-1 variable at jth (j varies from 3 to 10) node/limit shows 
the effect of audit committee level median directorships (x) below a given node/limit (x1) on the 
discretionary accruals. A positive coefficient implies that when the audit committee level median 
directorships are even less than a given endogenous node/limit, the busyness of directors at the 
given level is associated with increasing discretionary accruals, signifying decline in the quality of 
accounting information. Here, the underlying assumption is that busyness of directors of an audit 
committee beyond a certain limit can inflict agency costs on the firm.  
2. Spline-2- This coefficient of the Spline-2 variable at jth (j varies from 3 to 10) node/limit shows 
the effect of audit committee level median directorships (x) at and above a given node/limit (x1) 
on the discretionary accruals. A negative coefficient implies that when audit committee level 
median directorships exceed a given node/limit, the discretionary accruals diminish, and the 
quality of accounting information improves. Here, the underlying assumption is that the busyness 
of directors of an audit committee beyond a certain limit can actually improve the quality of 
information due to their enhanced reputational capital.  
3. Median committee to board size (Median committee-board size)- This is a measure of the 
intensity of busyness. It may be posited that when an audit committee member of a firm serves on 
specialized committees, such as audit committee, remuneration committee, and nomination 
committee, of other firms then it is expected that the audit committee member will find his/her 
workload more than when he/she accepts the same number of positions on the general board of 
directors. The findings of Tanyi and Smith (2015) and Méndez et al. (2015) provide empirical 
support to the above argument. This firm level measure is equal to the median committee 
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directorships undertaken by the audit committee members of a firm, scaled by the board size. The 
expected sign of the coefficient of this variable can be negative (resource dependence argument) 
or positive (agency theory argument).     
 
3.2.3 Corporate governance variables  
The following corporate governance variables are included in this paper: 
 
1. Board size- Dalton et al. (1999) and Goilden and Zajac (2001) highlight that board size affects 
firm performance favorably. The larger boards are more likely to have more and diverse 
reputational capital, and experience effective monitoring and control, which may result in higher 
quality of financial reporting process. On the other hand, Jermias and Gani (2014) and Guest 
(2009) find that it is relatively easier for the CEOs of firms having larger boards to influence 
outside directors and win their loyalty. Therefore, it can be assumed that firms with larger boards 
have lower quality of financial reporting. In the current study log values of board size are taken in 
order to avoid linearity, and no sign of the coefficient of the board size is predicted.                                
2. Independent directors proportion- The independent directors of a firm have a strong motivation 
to monitor the firm management in order to enhance their reputational capital in the labor market 
of corporate directors. ‘Like board, like committees’, implies that if a board of directors is relatively 
independent then it is more likely to induct independent directors in the committees too. Donnelly 
and Mulcahy (2008) find that an independent board itself plays an important role in reducing the 
information asymmetries between owners and managers. It is predicted that such board through 
its actions, and cooperation with the audit committee, can improve the quality of financial reports. 
This variable is calculated as the ratio of the number of independent directors to the board size of 
a firm. The squared values are taken in order to minimize the linearity problem, and the predicted 
sign is negative.  
3. Audit committee chairperson financial expertise (AC chair expertise)- The role of the 
chairperson of an audit committee is highly demanding. In the post-SOX scenario this role has 
increased manifolds. One of the most important objectives of an audit committee is to ensure that 
financial reporting quality and internal risk management is of the highest order, and in order to 
achieve this objective efficiently the chairperson of an audit committee is required to spend a large 
amount of time and attention. Tanyi and Smith (2015) underscore that the workload of an audit 
committee chairperson is substantially higher than an ordinary member of the same committee. 
The SOX Act (2002) requires that a firm must disclose in SEC filings that its audit committee 
chairperson and other committee members fulfil the education criteria in the field of finance. 
Several studies give empirical evidence that an audit committee chairperson, who has education 
in the field of finance and accounting, can perform such a challenging job in a more efficient 
manner. Abbott et al. (2004) and Bedard et al. 2004) find that firms having audit committees 
chaired by financial experts, experience less earnings management, and accounting restatements. 
In the current paper, this variable is a binary with the value ‘1’, if the chairperson of the audit 
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committee has financial/accounting qualification, ‘0’ otherwise. The predicted sign of this variable 
is negative.  
4. Debt-equity ratio- The principal-agent problem also exists between debt holders and 
management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Sarkar and Sarkar (2012) hold that in India debt plays 
an important place in the capital structure of firms. Therefore, a firm board in order to have cordial 
relationship with its debt holders, especially banks, can strengthen its internal control system, 
particularly by inducting more independent members in the audit committee. An independent audit 
can play an important role in increasing the reliability of the accounting numbers and mitigating 
monitoring costs of debt holders, therefore, the firm can obtain more debt at competitive terms 
(Sarens and Abdolmohammadi, 2011). Therefore, a negative association can be predicted between 
leverage and discretionary accruals. In the current paper, leverage is measured as a ratio of total 
value of debt to total market value of outstanding equity capital.    
 
5. Ratio of NAS revenue to total revenue of auditor- The current paper takes this ratio as the 
measure of extended interlocking. The section 139 of the Companies Act of India (MCA, 2013) 
disallows auditors to perform several types of NAS for their client firms (also subsidiaries and 
holding companies), including accounting and book keeping, investment advisory/banking, and 
internal audit services. However, there are several other types of services that audit firms can still 
do for their client firms. In the extended interlocking relationship, the audit committee members, 
and promotors often employ the same auditor in various firms in the business group (Johansen and 
Pettersson, 2013). The audit committees, executive directors and promoters of the client firms may 
prefer their audit firms to do the NAS too. However, a rising ratio of the NAS revenue to the total 
revenue of an auditor earned from a given client firm may also underpin diminishing independence 
of audit committee, weaker monitoring and control of managerial actions and lower quality of 
financial reports (Simunic, 1984; Beck et al., 1988). Zang and Emanueal (2008) find that when the 
relative share of NAS revenue to total revenue that an auditor earns from the client firm increases, 
it may imply that economic interests of an auditor are highly ingrained in the firm, and resultantly 
the auditor is less likely to challenge earnings management actions of managers. The predicted 
sign of this variable on firm performance is positive.    
3.2.4 Firm Level Control Variables  
 
In order to control for firm specific characteristics, the following variables have been added to the 
model: 
 
1. Research and development (R&D) intensity and 2. Advertisement intensity- Among control 
variables, research and development intensity and advertisement intensity are calculated by 
dividing respective expenditure on both items by sales revenue. These two variables are measures 
of firm growth as well bonding costs of managers (Ang et al., 2000; Easterbrook, 1984). Bonding 
costs are a part of agency costs, and are costs incurred by the agent in order to reflect his 
commitment to the firm. Such costs may also be incurred in order to give positive signals to 
investors and expect positive reaction of stock market (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The predicted 
sign of both variables is negative.  
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3. Trade intensity- Trade intensity shows how actively equity shares of a firm are traded in the 
stock market. This variable is calculated by dividing the number of shares traded by the total 
number of shares outstanding. Firms having active stocks are less likely to do earnings 
management as such action can invite stock market ire (Fan and Wong, 2002). The predicted sign 
is negative.   
 
4. Market-capitalization- Firm size is measured by market-capitalization (log values). Market-
capitalization is obtained by multiplying the market value of a share by the number of shares 
outstanding, at the end of the year. Big sized firms are less likely to use earnings management 
practice due to potential loss of reputation (Carey and Simnett, 2006). The predicted sign is 
negative.     
 
 The ordinary least square (OLS) regression technique is used to estimate the following functional 
relationship of the model: 
 
 DAit = αit+ β1(Spline-1)j2 + β2(Spline-2)j + β3(Median committee-board size)it + β4(Board size)it 
+ β5(Independent directors proportion)it + β6(AC chair expertise)it + β7(R&D intensity)it + 
β8(Advertisement intensity)it + β9(Trade intensity)it + β10(Debt-Equity ratio)it + β11(Market-
capitalization)it + β12(NAS to total revenue of auditor)it + error term 
 
4. Empirical findings and discussion 
From table 1 it can be noticed that the predicted sign of α2 is positive, because the working capital 
is expected to increase with the increase in the sales revenue. Similarly, the predicted sign of α3 is 
negative; because a higher amount of fixed assets produces higher depreciation expenses and 
deferred taxes, and as a result total accruals, measured by subtracting cash flows from operations 
from earnings before extraordinary items, decrease (Klein, 2002). From table 1, it can be seen that 
the expected and the realized coefficients have same signs. Nonetheless, α2 and α3 are significant 
for the full sample and sub samples, except for the sub sample of government owned firms. This 
finding indicates that the local private and foreign firms, in India, have the tendency to inflate 
(deflate) their income by increasing their sales revenue (expenditure on fixed assets). Based on the 
findings, given in table 1, it can be interpreted that the incidence of earnings management, 
measured by the discretionary accruals, has been relatively prominent in the local private and 
foreign firms in India. There has been no prediction made about the sign of α1, however, the same 
has been found to be negative for the local private sector firms, and positive for the foreign and 
the government sector firms.           
-Insert Table 1 here- 
Tables 2 to 5 highlight relationship between the busyness of audit committee members and the 
quality of financial reporting for sub-samples foreign, government, and local private firms and for 
                                                          
2 Spline-1 and spline-2 variables represent firm-level busyness nodes from three to ten.  
16 
 
the full sample. In tables 2 to 5, the spline nodes in the horizontal columns, (a) to (h), indicate the 
busyness level of the audit committee members, ranging from three to ten.     
-Insert Table 2 here- 
In table 2, results of the Spline-1 coefficient show that for the foreign firms, listed in the Indian 
stock exchanges, there is a positive association between the audit committee members’ busyness 
and the discretionary accruals. Nonetheless, this association becomes significant at the spline node 
six and onwards, implying that as the median directorships of audit committee members of a 
foreign firm turns six, the coefficient of discretionary accruals becomes significant. This result can 
be explained with the agency theory argument that busy audit committee members either do not 
have time to perform tasks entrusted to them and/or they lack the required focus to perform 
relatively complex tasks related to audit committees. This finding also indicates that some audit 
committee members may use multiple directorships as a tool to enhance their own economic 
interests in the market of corporate directors. As a result of the busyness of audit committee 
members, there is an adverse effect on the quality of financial reporting. Noticeably, the positive 
association between the audit committee members’ busyness and the discretionary accruals 
continues to remain significant up-to the final cut-off point of ten, which is the maximum busyness 
limit as per the Companies Act of India 2013 (MCA, 2013). Therefore, this finding is in conflict 
with the level of multiple directorships allowed by the regulator in India. A corporate director of a 
publicly traded firm can be on boards of other publicly traded firms in India as long as the total of 
such directorships does not exceed ten. However, the Spline-1 variable indicates that the quality 
of financial reporting starts deteriorating only when an audit committee director of the foreign firm 
in India assumes six outside directorships, albeit, the law allows him/her to have ten such 
assignments. Therefore, when ownership structure is acknowledged, the endogenously determined 
busyness limit (cut-off point six) provides better insight than that of exogenous limit (ten 
directorships) determined by regulators.  
The Spline-2 variable has been found to be significant, although at a very low level (cut-off point 
five). This finding implies that at a relatively low level of busyness the outside directorships 
accepted by an audit committee member can be beneficial to the firm in the form of better financial 
reporting quality. This finding can be backed up by the resource dependence theory that as the 
busyness level of audit committee members increases, they apply more diligence, and caution and 
do much improved monitoring of the managerial actions, which results in lower earning 
manipulation, nonetheless, this virtue cannot be obtained limitlessly by the firms. As the Spline-1 
variable shows above, at node six and above the harmful effects of multiple directorships start 
surfacing. Similar to the findings of the Spline-1 variable, the cut-off point of five of the Spline-2 
variable, upholds that an endogenously determined limit of busyness of directors provides better 
understanding of the association between multiple directorships of audit committee directors and 
financial reporting quality than the one prescribed by the regulators.  
For the Median committee- board size ratio, measuring the intensity of busyness, the findings show 
that from the cut-off point three to five the committee assignments (for example, audit committee, 
remuneration committee, and nomination committee, and not merely serving on general boards of 
directors) taken up by the audit committee members of the firm in other firms successfully lowers 
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the level of discretionary accruals, and thus improves quality of financial reports of the firm. 
However, this effect of this variable ceases to be significant beyond the spline node five. This 
result indicates that not only the number of busyness but also the nature of busyness, incorporating 
the demanding nature of workload in specialized committees, affects the quality of financial 
reporting. The above finding can also be explained with the help of the resource dependence theory 
(Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). The audit committee members due to their skills, expertise, 
experience, linkage to the external contingencies are better equipped to smother earnings 
manipulation practices, however, only up-to a certain limit, and beyond such limit the agency costs 
may neutralize beneficial effects of the resource dependence theory.           
Similarly, the AC chair expertise variable is associated with the improved quality of financial 
information at all the nodes indicating the busyness of audit committee members. The workload 
of an audit committee chairperson is highly demanding and financial skills oriented (Tanyi and 
Smith, 2015). The results show that irrespective of the busyness level of the audit committee 
members, the financial expertise of the audit committee chairperson plays a significant role to 
improve the quality of financial data. However, at the higher level of busyness the significance 
level starts diminishing indicating a possible trend. Similarly, the findings of the NAS to total 
revenue of auditor, the measure of extended interlocking, highlights its positive association with 
the discretionary accrual through all the spline nodes. The rising ratio of the NAS to the total 
revenue earned from a given client firm implies over economic dependence of the audit firm on 
its client and shrinking independence of the audit committee with respect to monitoring and control 
of managerial actions. Zang and Emanueal (2008) also find similar results in their study. The 
coefficients of the Board size, Independent directors proportion and Debt-Equity ratio have been 
found to be insignificant. Even though a bigger board of directors is assumed to be having 
relatively diverse reputational capital, and is more likely to produce objective financial results 
(Dalton et al., 1999; Goilden and Zajac, 2001), nonetheless, ensuring the credibility of financial 
reporting is a highly skill based function and the mere presence of more members in the board 
does not automatically imply high quality financial reporting. On the contrary, the audit committee 
members due to their specialized skills, education and expertise have a higher level of proficiency 
to perform such function more efficiently. Similarly, the Independent directors proportion 
coefficient is also insignificant. A possible explanation of this finding is that even though an 
independent board is expected to reduce information asymmetries between owners and managers 
(Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008) and high quality of financial reporting contributes to eliminate such 
asymmetries, nonetheless, the phenomenon of multiple directorships of audit committee members, 
even at lower spline nodes, may act as a limiting factor and render independent directors relatively 
ineffective. The same explanation also holds true for the insignificant effect of the debt-equity 
ratio on the financial reporting quality.  
Furthermore, the R&D intensity and the Advertisement intensity variables also indicate to have 
favorable effects on the financial reporting quality up-to spline node eight and throughout, 
respectively. Both variables are indicatives of firms’ growth and bonding costs of managers (Ang 
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et al., 2000; Easterbrook, 1984). The signals indicating managers’ loyalty/alignment to the firm’s 
interests and its growth orientations have a favorable association with the objective and true 
financial information of the firm. The results of the variable Trade intensity show that firms having 
relatively active stock have better quality of financial information but not after the busyness level 
exceeds spline node six. This finding is similar to that of Fan and Wong (2002), and implying that 
firms whose stocks are traded actively have to face investors’ ire relatively more if they indulge in 
earnings management practices. In the current paper, the firm size is measured by the log values 
of Market-capitalization, and the results indicate that bigger firms have lower incidence of 
earnings management due to fear of loss of reputation (Carey and Simnett, 2006).  
-Insert Table 3 here- 
Table 3 highlights the association between discretionary accruals and the busyness of audit 
committee members of the government owned firms in India. The coefficient of Spline-1 variable 
turns significantly positively at node six showing deteriorating financial reporting quality at the 
increased level of busyness of audit committee members. The association gets even stronger as the 
busyness increases further. The coefficients of Spline-2 variable remain insignificant throughout 
the spline nodes, highlighting that the reputational capital of directors does not play any role in 
improving quality of the financial data. A possible reason for such finding is that for a government 
owned firms the appointment of directors on its boards is relatively driven by bureaucratic factors 
rather than the reputational capital of directors.  The coefficient of the third variable of busyness, 
the Median committee- board size ratio turns positive and significant at the spline node six and 
becomes even more significant at the subsequent spline nodes. This finding implies that not only 
the number of busyness of the audit committee members adversely affects the quality of financial 
reporting but also the nature of busyness. The outside specialized committee memberships of 
boards of directors can absorb a substantial amount of time and attention of the audit committee 
members of the firm and resultantly the financial reporting quality of the firm is adversely affected.    
Similarly, the effect of the Independent directors proportion variable is favorable on the quality of 
financial data of the government owned firms throughout the spline nodes. The appointment of 
executive directors on the government owned firms is a bureaucratic matter (Sarkar and Sarkar, 
2012), however, the independent directors, who also form a majority in the audit committees, may 
put more emphasis to improve the financial reporting quality even at a higher level of busyness in 
order to enhance their reputational capital. The variable Debt-equity ratio is having an insignificant 
effect on the quality of financial reporting. The government owned firms, generally, do not have 
the same kind of concerns in the matters pertaining to their financing. Therefore, this variable, 
which essentially underlines the capital structure of firms does not influence financial reporting 
quality irrespective of busyness of the audit committee members. Similarly, the effects of the AC 
chair expertise and the Board size are also insignificant. The peculiar institutional settings of the 
government owned firms can be attributed to these results. Similarly, the finding of the NAS to 
total revenue of auditor, measuring the extended interlocking, shows a positive association with 
the discretionary accrual throughout the spline nodes. The auditors’ economic interests on client 
firms adversely affect the financial reporting quality at all cut-off points of audit committee 
members’ busyness.  
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The coefficient of variables, the R&D intensity and the Advertisement intensity, both measuring 
bonding costs incurred by executives and growth orientation of firms, show their adverse effect on 
the financial reporting quality. Many agency theorists (for example, Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Easterbrook, 1984) have debated whether monitoring and bonding can be substitutes. A popular 
argument in the agency theory highlights that if agents incur bonding costs, then their alignment 
with the utility function followed with that of the principal increases. The findings show that 
bonding costs not only fail to substitute the monitoring of corporate executives but they are even 
associated with deteriorated financial reporting quality. Possibly, firm managers even use 
expenditures on advertisement and R&D to manipulate discretionary accruals for their vested 
interests. The insignificant coefficient of the variable Trade intensity further highlights the unique 
institutional settings in which the government owned firms’ shares are traded. Similar to the 
findings in the case of foreign firms, the coefficients of the Market-capitalization indicate that 
bigger firms have lower incidence of earnings management due to fear of loss of reputation.       
  -Insert Table 4 here- 
Table 4 shows the association between discretionary accruals and busyness of audit committee 
members of local private sector listed firms in India. The coefficient of Spline-1 variable becomes 
significantly positive at the spline node five and it gets even stronger as the busyness level of the 
audit committee members increases further. The Spline-2 variable, highlighting ‘good effects’ of 
the busyness of the audit committee members, as mentioned in the resource dependence theory, is 
significantly negative up-to spline node four. This finding implies that at a relatively low level of 
busyness, the audit committee members of local private firms in India are relatively motivated by 
the reputational capital effect and as a result they monitor and control managerial actions with due 
diligence and effectively check the objectivity and truthfulness of financial reports of firms, 
however, at a higher level of busyness (the spline node of five and above) they may be lacking 
time and focus required to perform their core responsibilities. Similarly, the coefficient of the third 
variable of busyness, the Median committee- board size ratio turns positive and significant at the 
spline node six and becomes even more significant at the subsequent spline nodes.  
Similarly, the effect of the Independent directors proportion variable is favorable on the quality of 
financial data of the local private firms, however, not after the spline node five.  The Indian 
corporate sector is dominated by the promoter owned firms, and in such firms the role of 
independent directors may not be effective in maintaining the quality of financial reports, 
especially at the higher level of busyness of audit committee members. The variable Debt-equity 
ratio is having significant effect on improving of financial reports throughout. Due to high 
relevance of debt in the capital structure of the local private sector firms in India, it is utmost 
important for such firms to reveal their real financial health by disclosing objective financial data 
of the firm in order to strengthen their ties with the institutional lenders (Sarkar and Sarkar, 2012). 
The increasing Debt-equity ratio implies more managerial discipline irrespective of the busyness 
of the audit committee of the firm. Similarly, the effect of the AC chair expertise is favorable on 
the quality of financial data, albeit up-to the spline node six. The financial expertise of the audit 
committee chairperson can play an important role in mitigating earnings management practices, 
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however, at an increased level of the busyness of audit committee members, the coefficient turns 
insignificant. Similarly, the coefficient of the NAS to total revenue of auditor, measuring extended 
interlocking, signifies its positive association with the discretionary accrual through all the spline 
nodes. The rising ratio of the NAS to the total revenue earned by an audit firm from its client firm 
underlines over economic dependence of the audit firm on its client, and also diminishing 
independence of the audit committee in the matters pertaining to monitoring and control of 
managerial actions. The coefficient of Board size of the local private firms indicates that larger 
board size is associated with the enhanced financial reporting quality and this finding gets the 
support of Dalton et al. (1999) and (Goilden and Zajac 2001), who argue in favor of larger boards’ 
diversity and level of reputational capital, which play an important role in better monitoring and 
improved financial reporting process. Furthermore, the R&D intensity and the Advertisement 
intensity variables also indicate their good effects on the financial reporting quality throughout and 
up-to spline node eight, respectively. Both variables indicate that when interests of managers are 
aligned with those of firms and when firms endeavor to grow, the financial reporting quality 
improves. Similarly, the variable Trade intensity shows that firms having relatively active stock 
have better quality of financial information. The local private firms having highly active stocks 
may invite a more negative reaction of investors if such firms do not pay any attention to improving 
their financial data. The coefficient of Market-capitalization variable, measuring the firm size, 
indicates that bigger firms have lower incidence of earnings management due to fear of loss of 
reputation, however, not beyond the spline node six.  
-Insert Table 5 here- 
Table 5 shows the association between discretionary accruals and busyness of audit committee 
members for the full sample. The coefficient of Spline-1 remains significantly positive throughout 
only when starting from the spline node six. The variable Spline-2, highlighting virtues of busyness 
of audit committee members, according to the resource dependence theory, is significantly 
negative up-to the spline node four. Furthermore, the coefficient of Median committee- board size 
also gets significantly positive starting from the spline node six. Overall, the analysis of the above 
three busyness variables reveals that at the lower level of busyness (up-to the spline node four), 
the busyness of audit committee members helps to enhance financial reporting quality; whereas, 
at the relatively higher level of busyness (six and above), the same has a detrimental effect on 
financial reporting quality.  
The Board size helps to enhance financial reporting quality but only up-to spline node six. 
Similarly, the Independent directors proportion affects the financial reporting quality favorably 
throughout. Similarly, the AC chair expertise is associated with improved financial information 
but not after the spline node seven. The coefficient of Debt-equity ratio, signifying the corporate 
capital structure, has an improvement effect on the quality of financial reporting up-to node five. 
On the other hand, the NAS to total revenue of auditor has an unfavorable effect on financial 
reporting quality up-to node four. Surprisingly, for all the sub-samples, this variable affects 
financial reporting quality adversely throughout the busyness level of audit committee members. 
An explanation to the above aberration observed in the full sample is that the interlocking between 
the promoters and audit committee members does not transform into extended interlocking due to 
the possible loss of reputation of audit committee directors and adverse reaction of investors.  
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The coefficient of the R&D intensity affects the financial reporting quality favorably throughout, 
whereas those of the Advertisement intensity, the Trade intensity, and the Market-capitalization 
(firm size) have the same effect up-to a relatively lower level of busyness (spline node four).  
-Insert Table 6 here- 
Table 6 summarizes the endogenously determined busyness limits of the audit committee members 
based on the effects of such busyness on the financial reporting quality, measured by discretionary 
accruals. The effects of the association between the busyness of audit committee members and the 
quality of financial reporting are reported in this table from the agency, and resource dependence 
theoretical perspectives. Neither, endogenously determined limits of busyness of sub samples nor 
that of the full sample are in conformity with the exogenously prescribed limits of the regulator in 
India.           
5. Conclusions and future research 
Shareholders and several other stakeholders of firms seek to use objective financial information in 
order to observe firms’ actions and their effects on them, in order to make rational decisions. The 
audit committee, a part of the internal corporate governance mechanism of firms, aims to ensure 
that the financial statements and related disclosures are prepared according to the legal 
requirements, and accounting standards set by regulators and professional bodies. An audit 
committee can perform its functions efficiently, when it is able to operate independent of 
managerial influences. Among other things, the number of directorships (boards and committees) 
accepted by directors of a given firm in other firms is an important determinant of the independence 
of the audit committee. The agency theory argument follows that as the number of outside 
directorships of the audit committee members of a firm increases, their effectiveness to review 
financial statements, and question the managerial actions diminish. However, according to the 
resource dependence theory, the phenomenon of multiple directorships of the audit committee 
members is associated with their enhanced human and relational capital, collectively known as the 
reputational capital. The current paper has examined, first, whether multiple directorships of the 
audit committee members affect quality of financial data in India, and second, whether 
endogenously determined limits of busyness of the audit committee members explains their 
association with the financial reporting quality better than those by the exogenous limits prescribed 
by the regulator. In an emerging country like India, where the foreign, and local private sector have 
been showing continuous growth, government owned firms have been maintaining their traditional 
importance, and at the same time their ownership structure and other institutional settings are 
markedly different, it is also important to study the association between multiple directorships of 
the audit committee members and the financial reporting quality based on the sub-samples along 
with the full sample.    
The study shows that for the foreign, government owned firms, and full sample, the busyness of 
audit committee members does not affect financial reporting quality adversely before the median 
audit committee members at the firm level turns six, however, for the local private firms, the same 
phenomenon is observed not before five audit committee memberships. An interesting feature of 
the findings of the current paper is that the agency costs, in the form of poor quality of financial 
reporting, proxied by the discretionary accruals, emerge before reaching the regulatory limit of 
maximum ten directorships. Similarly, in the current paper the endogenously determined range of 
multiple directorships of audit committee members also highlight their favorable effects on the 
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financial reporting quality. The sub-samples of the foreign, local private sector firms and the full 
sample firms experience improvements in financial reporting quality at the lower level of busyness 
of the audit committee members, whereas, for the government owned firms, such beneficial effect 
never reaches at any point in the entire range of spline nodes. Overall, it can be concluded based 
on the analysis of the Spline-1 and the Spline-2 that the lower level of busyness of the audit 
committee members can be beneficial to firms; however, the same at the higher level of busyness 
can be detrimental to the financial reporting quality.       
Similarly, the third variable of busyness i.e. median committee to board size, measuring the 
intensity of busyness, indicates mixed results. For the sub-samples of government, and local 
private firms and full sample, the intensity of busyness unfavorably affects the financial reporting 
quality at a relatively higher level of audit committee members’ busyness, whereas, for the sub 
samples of foreign firms the favorable effect of the same variable is significant at a lower level.  
The current paper contributes to the extant literature in several ways, first, the endogenously 
determined busyness limits explain the association between multiple directorships of audit 
committee members and the quality of financial reporting better than those exogenously 
recommended by regulators; second, despite applying the endogenous limits of busyness in the 
analysis for the full sample and sub-samples, the results reveal that ‘one size does not fit all’, that 
is the cut-off points of busyness highlighting the optimum level of busyness for the different 
ownership groups are not uniform, therefore, the current paper incorporates the institutional 
settings in which firms operate; third, this paper, along with the number of multiple directorships 
of the audit committee members in per se, also recognizes the nature of multiple directorships and 
analyzes their effects on the financial reporting quality, therefore, the regulator should not 
recommend a single upper limit of busyness of directors of a firm as such limits do not take into 
account the intensity of busyness of board, and committee members; and lastly, the current paper 
is one of the few studies in the settings of an emerging economy, such as India, and inferences 
drawn on the basis of the findings of this paper can be useful for countries having comparable 
corporate landscape.                               
The current paper has certain limitations too. First, the current paper is not considering alternative 
measures of the quality of financial information; therefore, robustness of the explained variable 
cannot be determined. Second, despite recognizing that the intensity of busyness is an important 
contribution of this paper, nonetheless, the current paper does not study the effect of busyness of 
the audit committee members of the firms in the same committee of other firms. The reason for 
this limitation is that the available data in the current study is only pertaining to the busyness of 
the audit committee members of a firm in other firms, categorized as ‘boards’ and ‘committees’, 
and no further break up of ‘committees’ is available.  
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Table 1: Comparison of coefficients of discretionary accruals for sub-samples and overall 
sample (Data: 2004-12) 
Coefficientsa Expected 
Sign 
Sub-sample 1 
(Private Local) 
Sub-sample 2 
(Foreign)  
Sub-sample 3 
(Government) 
Overall 
sample 
α1 ?  -1210.551** 
(-11.42) 
1150.293*** 
(24.11) 
2352.319** 
(7.88) 
-0.007 
(-0.881) 
α2 +ve 0.521**  
(3.78) 
2.563*** 
(173.77) 
0.011 
(0.712) 
0.265** 
(13.235) 
α3 -ve -0.547**  
(-3.98) 
-0.021**  
(-6.22) 
0.002 
(0.121) 
-0.223** 
(-11.191) 
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N (Firm-
Years)   
 2376 585 772 3733 
a Jones (1991) expectation model (1991) model has been applied to estimate coefficients of 
discretionary accruals. The model is as below: 
TAit/Ait-1 = α1 (1/ Ait-1) + α2 (∆REVit/Ait-1) + α3 (PPEit/Ait-1 )+ Ɛit 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, and † p < 0.1 (t-statistics appear in parentheses) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Association between discretionary accruals and busyness of audit committee members-foreign firms (Data: 2004-12) 
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Note: #OLS estimates are shown in above table (t-statistics appear in parentheses). 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, and † p < 0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Association between discretionary accruals and busyness of audit committee members-government firms (Data: 2004-12) 
Discretionary variable 
(dependent variable) 
 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Spline 
Node=3 
Spline 
Node=4 
Spline 
Node=5 
Spline 
Node=6 
Spline 
Node=7 
Spline 
Node=8 
Spline 
Node=9 
Spline 
Node=10 
Intercept  31.222*** 
(126.387) 
31.118*** 
(123.686) 
31.118*** 
(123.686) 
30.101*** 
(118.118) 
29.229*** 
(114.283) 
26.056*** 
(110.009) 
26.056*** 
(110.009) 
26.033*** 
(108.119) 
Spline-1 0.131 
(1.141) 
0.142 
(1.152) 
0.147 
(1.168) 
0.160† 
(1.477) 
0.205* 
(2.045) 
0.206* 
(2.053) 
0.206* 
(2.053) 
0.206* 
(2.056) 
Spline-2 -0.155† 
(-1.432) -0.155
† 
(-1.432) 
-0.157† 
(-1.439) 
-0.142 
(-1.149) 
-0.131 
(-1.141) 
-0.129 
(-1.129) 
-0.121 
(-1.117) 
-0.121 
(-1.117) 
Median committee- 
board size 
-0.189*  
(-1.952) -0.167
† 
(-1.537) 
-0.159† 
(-1.465) 
-0.149 
(-1.184) 
-0.142 
(-1.152) 
-0.140 
(-1.137) 
-0.140 
(-1.137) 
-0.140 
(-1.137) 
Board size  0.001 
(0.058) 0.001  (0.058) 
0.001 
 (0.058) 
0.001 
 (0.058) 
0.001 
 (0.058) 
0.001 
 (0.058) 
0.001 
 (0.058) 
0.001 
 (0.058) 
Independent directors 
proportion 
0.001 
(0.866) 
0.001 
(0.866) 
0.001 
(0.866) 
0.001 
(0.866) 
0.001 
(0.866) 
0.001 
(0.866) 
0.001 
(0.866) 
0.001 
(0.866) 
AC chair expertise -0.269** 
(-2.832) -0.269
** 
(-2.834) 
-0.269** 
(-2.832) 
-0.257* 
(-2.223) 
-0.227* 
(-2.129) 
-0.228* 
(-2.138) 
-0.226* 
(-2.111) 
-0.226* 
(-2.111) 
R&D intensity -0.205* 
(-2.048) 
-0.205* 
(-2.048) 
-0.197* 
(-1.996) -0.167
† 
(-1.612) 
-0.167† 
(-1.612) 
-0.167† 
(-1.611) 
-0.147 
(-1.169) 
-0.147 
(-1.169) 
Advertisement 
intensity 
-0.011** 
(-8.465) 
-0.013** 
(-8.667) 
-0.013** 
(-8.667) -0.009
** 
(-6.056) 
-0.009** 
(-6.056) 
-0.005** 
(-4.998) 
-0.001* 
(-2.222) 
-0.001* 
(-2.219) 
Trade intensity -0.001† 
(-1.537) 
-0.001† 
(-1.538) 
-0.001† 
(-1.538) 
-0.001† 
(-1.538) 
0.000 
(-1.154) 
0.000 
(-1.154) 
0.000 
(-1.154) 
0.000 
(-1.154) 
Debt-Equity ratio 0.000 
(0.091) 
0.000 
(0.091) 
0.000 
(0.091) 
0.000 
(0.091) 
0.000 
(0.091) 
0.000 
(0.091) 
0.000 
(0.091) 
0.000 
(0.091) 
Market-capitalization  -0.334** 
(-5.435) 
-0.312** 
(-5.257) 
-0.253** 
(-2.442) -0.223
* 
(-2.053) 
-0.223* 
(-2.053) 
-0.223* 
(-2.053) 
-0.179† 
(-1.623) 
-0.167† 
(-1.545) 
NAS to total revenue of 
auditor 
0.195* 
(2.011) 
0.195* 
(2.011) 
0.195* 
(2.011) 0.195
* 
(2.011) 
0.195* 
(2.011) 
0.195* 
(2.011) 
0.195* 
(2.011) 
0.195* 
(2.011) 
Adjusted R2 0.42 0.44 0.44 0.42 0.42 0.44 0.45 0.45 
N (Firm-Years)   585 585 585 585 585 585 585 585 
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Note: #OLS estimates are shown in above table (t-statistics appear in parentheses). 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, and † p < 0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Association between discretionary accruals and busyness of audit committee members-private firms (Data: 2004-12) 
Discretionary variable 
(dependent variable) 
 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Spline 
Node=3 
Spline 
Node=4 
Spline 
Node=5 
Spline 
Node=6 
Spline 
Node=7 
Spline 
Node=8 
Spline 
Node=9 
Spline 
Node=10 
Intercept  9.998*** 
(29.086) 
9.998*** 
(29.086) 
9.972*** 
(26.183) 
9.961*** 
(23.118) 
9.961*** 
(23.118) 
9.961*** 
(23.118) 
9.961*** 
(23.118) 
9.961*** 
(23.118) 
Spline-1 0.831 
(1.121) 
0.842 
(1.172) 
0.847 
(1.221) 
0.972† 
(1.621) 
1.124* 
(2.123) 
1.132** 
(2.636) 
1.132** 
(2.636) 
1.132** 
(2.636) 
Spline-2 -0.001 
(-0.942) 
-0.001 
(-0.942) 
-0.001 
(-0.942) 
-0.001 
(-0.942) 
-0.001 
(-0.942) 
-0.001 
(-0.942) 
-0.001 
(-0.942) 
-0.001 
(-0.942) 
Median committee- board 
size 
0.842 
(1.267) 
0.842 
(1.267) 
0.842 
(1.267) 
1.017* 
(2.239) 
1.038** 
(3.771) 
1.038** 
(3.771) 
1.258** 
(8.668) 
1.269** 
(9.771) 
Board size  -0.001 
(-0.619) 
-0.001 
(-0.619) 
-0.001 
(-0.619) 
-0.001 
(-0.619) 
-0.001 
(-0.619) 
-0.001 
(-0.619) 
-0.001 
(-0.619) 
-0.001 
(-0.619) 
Independent directors 
proportion 
-2.229** 
(4.026) 
-2.237** 
(4.817) 
-2.242** 
(5.026) 
-2.242** 
(5.026) 
-2.244** 
(5.087) 
-2.254** 
(5.126) 
-2.256** 
(5.137) 
-2.267** 
(5.289) 
AC chair expertise -0.063 
(-1.089) 
-0.063 
(-1.089) 
-0.063 
(-1.089) 
-0.066 
(-1.093) 
-0.061 
(-1.044) 
-0.053 
(-1.001) 
-0.053 
(-1.001) 
-0.053 
(-1.001) 
R&D intensity 1.031* 
(2.048) 
1.029* 
(2.008) 
1.028* 
(1.994)) 1.026
* 
(1.848) 
1.026* 
(1.848) 
1.021* 
(1.778) 
1.012* 
(1.665) 
1.012* 
(1.665) 
Advertisement intensity 1.213** 
(8.267) 
1.213** 
(8.267) 
1.213** 
(8.267) 
1.212** 
(8.203) 
1.210** 
(8.056) 
1.207** 
(7.765) 
1.206** 
(7.722) 
1.206** 
(7.722) 
Trade intensity 0.000 
(-1.184) 
0.000 
(-1.184) 
0.000 
(-1.184) 
0.000 
(-1.184) 
0.000 
(-1.184) 
0.000 
(-1.184) 
0.000 
(-1.184) 
0.000 
(-1.184) 
Debt-Equity ratio 0.000 
(0.313) 
0.000 
(0.313) 
0.000 
(0.313) 
0.000 
(0.313) 
0.000 
(0.313) 
0.000 
(0.313) 
0.000 
(0.313) 
0.000 
(0.313) 
Market-capitalization  -0.352** 
(-5.039) 
-0.352** 
(-5.039) 
-0.352** 
(-5.039) 
-0.353** 
(-5.117) 
-0.354** 
(-5.276) 
-0.354** 
(-5.276) 
-0.352** 
(-5.038) 
-0.352** 
(-5.037) 
NAS to total revenue of 
auditor 
0.525** 
(7.631) 
0.525** 
(7.631) 
0.525** 
(7.631) 
0.525** 
(7.631) 
0.525** 
(7.631) 
0.525** 
(7.631) 
0.525** 
(7.631) 
0.525** 
(7.631) 
Adjusted R2 0.33 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.36 0.36 0.35 
N (Firm-Years)   772 772 772 772 772 772 772 772 
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Note: #OLS estimates are shown in above table (t-statistics appear in parentheses). 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, and † p < 0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Association between discretionary accruals and busyness of audit committee members-full sample (Data: 2004-12) 
Discretionary variable 
(dependent variable) 
 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Spline 
Node=3 
Spline 
Node=4 
Spline 
Node=5 
Spline 
Node=6 
Spline 
Node=7 
Spline 
Node=8 
Spline 
Node=9 
Spline 
Node=10 
Intercept  10.281*** 
(80.650) 
10.293*** 
(80.723) 
10.311*** 
(81.293) 
10.313*** 
(81.446) 
10.311*** 
(81.293) 
10.311*** 
(81.293) 
10.313*** 
(81.446) 
10.313*** 
(81.446) 
Spline-1 0.423 
(1.223) 
0.427 
(1.257) 
0.511† 
(1.588) 
0.823* 
(2.319) 
1.106** 
(6.123) 
1.132** 
(8.636) 
1.132** 
(8.636) 
1.133** 
(8.707) 
Spline-2 -0.951† 
(-1.542) 
-0.951† 
(-1.542) 
-0.821 
(-1.212) 
-0.819 
(-1.142) 
-0.808 
(-1.117) 
-0.801 
(-1.009) 
-0.801 
(-1.009) 
-0.801 
(-1.009) 
Median committee- board 
size 
0.542 
(1.137) 
0.616 
(1.202) 
0.736 
(1.279) 
1.012* 
(2.023) 
1.023** 
(5.971) 
1.023** 
(5.971) 
1.046** 
(6.467) 
1.046** 
(6.467) 
Board size  -0.246† 
(-1.319) 
-0.297† 
(-1.489) 
-0.321* 
(-2.219) 
-0.593** 
(-3.787) 
-1.116** 
(-8.227) 
-1.213** 
(-9.852) 
-1.229** 
(-10.511) 
-1.237** 
(-10.819) 
Independent directors 
proportion 
-0.767† 
(1.526) 
-0.642† 
(1.301) 
-0.617† 
(1.287) 
-0.526 
(1.209) 
-0.516 
(1.171) 
-0.507 
(1.089) 
-0.492 
(0.847) 
-0.488 
(0.809) 
AC chair expertise -0.937* 
(-2.299) 
-0.877* 
(-1.889) 
-0.863* 
(-1.733) 
-0.856† 
(-1.547) 
-0.721 
(-1.167) 
-0.662 
(-1.023) 
-0.653 
(-0.901) 
-0.637 
(-0.827) 
R&D intensity -1.431** 
(9.248) 
-1.414** 
(9.057) 
-1.313** 
(8.648) -1.302
** 
(8.329) 
-1.251** 
(8.079) 
-1.237** 
(7.848) 
-1.231** 
(7.273) 
-1.229** 
(7.157) 
Advertisement intensity -0.877* 
(-1.889) 
-0.877* 
(-1.889) 
-0.857* 
(-1.722) 
-0.857* 
(-1.722) 
-0.857† 
(-1.629) 
-0.849† 
(-1.547) 
-0.626 
(1.209) 
-0.523 
(-1.077) 
Trade intensity -1.018** 
(-3.370) 
-1.018** 
(-3.370) 
-1.023** 
(-3.579) 
-1.024** 
(-3.613) 
-1.022** 
(-3.512) 
-1.019** 
(-3.439) 
-1.018** 
(-3.370) 
-1.018** 
(-3.370) 
Debt-Equity ratio -1.126*** 
(-26.434) 
-1.115*** 
(-23.129) 
-1.114*** 
(-22.481) 
-1.116*** 
(-23.229) 
-1.107*** 
(-20.673) 
-1.111*** 
(-21.841) 
-1.109*** 
(-21.533) 
-1.112*** 
(-22.227) 
Market-capitalization  -0.352* 
(-1.835) 
-0.312* 
(-1.733) 
-0.224† 
(-1.622) 
-0.209† 
(-1.553) 
-0.145 
(-1.176) 
-0.143 
(-1.121) 
-0.125 
(-1.041) 
-0.124 
(-1.003) 
NAS to total revenue of 
auditor 
0.578** 
(8.076) 
0.578** 
(8.076) 
0.578** 
(8.076) 
0.578** 
(8.076) 
0.578** 
(8.076) 
0.578** 
(8.076) 
0.578** 
(8.076) 
0.578** 
(8.076) 
Adjusted R2 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.49 
N (Firm-Years)   2376 2376 2376 2376 2376 2376 2376 2376 
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Note: #OLS estimates are shown in above table (t-statistics appear in parentheses). 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, and † p < 0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DA (dependent 
variable) 
 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
 Spline 
Node=3 
Spline 
Node=4 
Spline 
Node=5 
Spline 
Node=6 
Spline 
Node=7 
Spline 
Node=8 
Spline 
Node=9 
Spline 
Node=10 
Intercept  15.762*** 
(81.629) 
15.467*** 
(76.923) 
15.401*** 
(75.411) 
15.353*** 
(73.632) 
15.311*** 
(72.392) 
15.302*** 
(70.122) 
15.113*** 
(69.887) 
14.944*** 
(69.229) 
Spline-1 0.423 
(0.675) 
0.427 
(0.727) 
0.711 
(1.023) 
1.023† 
(1.302) 
1.121* 
(1.819) 
1.127* 
(1.923) 
1.132* 
(2.236) 
1.133* 
(2.319) 
Spline-2 -0.949† 
(-1.532) 
-0.957† 
(-1.572) 
-0.841 
(-1.257) 
-0.816 
(-1.221) 
-0.805 
(-1.203) 
-0.799 
(-1.192) 
-0.799 
(-1.192) 
-0.799 
(-1.192) 
Median committee- 
board size 
0.542 
(1.169) 0.516 
(1.133) 
0.667 
(1.243) 
1.012* 
(2.223) 
1.801** 
(5.771) 
1.722** 
(4.561) 
1.734** 
(5.119) 
1.721** 
(4.112) 
Board size  -0.246† 
(-1.319) 
-0.297† 
(-1.452) 
-0.321* 
(-2.219) 
-0.246† 
(-1.323) 
-0.221 
(-1.119) 
-0.187 
(-0.877) 
-0.145 
(-0.711) 
-0.123 
(-0.619) 
Independent directors 
proportion 
-1.396** 
(5.199) -1.386
** 
(4.787) 
-1.396** 
(5.199) 
-1.399** 
(5.442) 
-1.396** 
(5.199) 
-1.395** 
(5.112) 
-1.395** 
(5.112) 
-1.395** 
(5.112) 
AC chair expertise -0.831* 
(-1.349) 
-0.877* 
(-1.889) 
-0.851* 
(-1.665) 
-0.846† 
(-1.541) 
-0.846† 
(-1.541) 
-0.762 
(-1.188) 
-0.653 
(-1.065) 
-0.637 
(-1.027) 
R&D intensity -1.030** 
(8.248) 
-1.022** 
(7.901) 
-1.017** 
(7.447) -1.016
** 
(6.931) 
-1.011** 
(6.551) 
-1.009** 
(6.448) 
-1.007** 
(6.319) 
-1.007** 
(6.319) 
Advertisement intensity -0.857† 
(-1.629) 
-0.849† 
(-1.547) 
-0.661 
(-1.242) 
-0.603 
(-1.037) 
-0.603 
(-1.037) 
-0.601 
(-0.842) 
-0.576 
(-0.676) 
-0.576 
(-0.676) 
Trade intensity -0.657† 
(-1.432) 
-0.626† 
(-1.301) 
-0.601 
(-1.165) 
-0.587 
(-1.114) 
-0.544 
(-1.025) 
-0.521 
(-0.972) 
-0.517 
(-0.923) 
-0.513 
(-0.905) 
Debt-Equity ratio -0.432** 
(-6.434) 
-0.419** 
(-5.117) 
-0.265* 
(-2.167) 
-0.129 
(-1.174) 
-0.126 
(-1.014) 
-0.123 
(-1.002) 
-0.123 
(-1.002) 
-0.123 
(-1.002) 
Market-capitalization  -0.047† 
(-1.635) 
-0.042† 
(-1.533) 
-0.034 
(-1.222) -0.031 
(-1.115) 
-0.028 
(-1.009) 
-0.028 
(-1.009) 
-0.028 
(-1.009) 
-0.028 
(-1.009) 
NAS to total revenue of 
auditor 
0.082* 
(2.176) 
0.066† 
(1.626) 
0.047 
(1.222) 0.047 (1.222) 
0.047 
(1.222) 
0.047 
(1.222) 
0.047 
(1.222) 
0.047 
(1.222) 
Adjusted R2 0.56 0.59 0.59 0.57 0.60 0.59 0.59 0.59 
N (Firm-Years)   3733 3733 3733 3733 3733 3733 3733 3733 
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Table 6: Association between discretionary accruals and busyness of audit committee members-summary findings full sample (Data: 
2004-12) 
 
 
Effect of AC Busyness on Bad Effects (agency theory) Good Effects (resource-dependence theory) 
Foreign Firms (585 firm-years) ≥6 None 
Government Firms (772 firm-years) ≥6 ≤5 
Local Private Firms (2376 firm-years) ≥5 None 
Overall Sample (3733firm-years) ≥6 ≤4 
